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Summary 
Technological revolutions bring opportunities, but sometimes even greater threats. This 
‘paradox of progress’ affects cyberspace today, threatening to undermine the very principle 
and foundation of the open internet. The global debate on cyber-governance is currently in a 
stalemate on the norms for global stability of cyberspace and the fight against cybercrime, 
although the EU is making considerable efforts to strengthen the resilience of cyberspace and 
the critical information infrastructure. The newly proposed Cybersecurity Act should, 
however, be supported by additional measures to increase awareness, devise smarter policy 
and enable effective governance. Too many users and businesses are still failing to take 
cybersecurity and computer hygiene seriously. And there is a need to strengthen the pan-
European coordination of deterrence, detection, and defence. This paper looks at the 
possibilities for the EU in this domain and argues that at a time of American diplomatic and 
political retrenchment from Europe and the world, it has an opportunity to play a leading role 
in global cybersecurity policy and governance.  
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Introduction 
Cybersecurity is the talk of the town. It is invoked with a sense of urgency in the most 
important political fora around the world. Many citizens have now become familiar with the 
arcane names of cyberattacks such as WannaCry, Petya and, more recently, Meltdown and 
Spectre, two of the worst IT security failures ever seen. To many companies, the question is 
not whether, but when they will be hit by a cyberattack. According to some observers, this is 
a sign of the times: the nature of global conflicts is changing profoundly. The US National 
Intelligence Council Global Trends Report warned recently that 
future conflicts will increasingly emphasize the disruption of critical infrastructure, 
societal cohesion, and basic governments functions in order to secure psychological and 
geopolitical advantages, rather than the defeat of enemy forces on the battlefield 
through traditional military means.1  
At a time when we rely increasingly on the digital 
infrastructure for the storage of data and the delivery of 
key services, those same assets become the main, and 
probably easy, target of cyberwarfare: this is the so-called 
paradox of progress; our society is more efficient as 
digitalisation progresses, but is also more fragile. 
The new age of cyberwarfare is characterised by a rise in state-sponsored cyber offensives. 
These include, among others, collection operations, such as Russia’s attacks on the networks 
of the US Democratic Party in 2016, or recent attempts to influence European elections, 
mostly to stir up social unrest and destabilisation; and intrusions to hold targets at risk, i.e. 
network intrusions to develop offensive capabilities against future targets, such as the attack 
on the power grid in Ukraine in 2015 or, possibly, North Korea’s involvement in the WannaCry 
ransomware of last year.2 These offensives are likely to succeed: offence has plenty of options 
when it comes to penetrating networks and data centres, whereas incentives to invest in 
cybersecurity are insufficient in an interconnected society in which only a collective and 
coordinated effort between private and public players can lead to sufficient levels of 
resilience. In other words, attackers only have to be patient: they will, sooner or later, hit the 
                                                     
1
 US National Intelligence Council (2017), “Global Trends: Paradox of Progress”, January, p. 20. 
2
 Ben Buchanan and Michael Sulmeyer (2016), “Russia and Cyber Operations: Challenges and Opportunities for 
the Next U.S. Administration”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. See also David E. Sanger (2017), 
“U.S. Accuses North Korea of Mounting WannaCry Cyberattack”, The New York Times, 18 December. 
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target. These reiterated attacks make cybersecurity a permanent, 24/7 activity; accordingly, 
the line between ‘peacetime’ and ‘wartime’ is blurred, as warfare is ‘softwarised’ and made 
constant.  
Will these trends permanently undermine security, or is 
there a way to build long-term opportunities? The buzzword 
here is ‘resilience’, which requires not only world-class 
infrastructure, but also a set of smart policies on 
preparedness, awareness and mitigation, as well as 
investment in enhanced awareness, smart policies and 
effective governance.  
Enhance awareness: cybersecurity as a collective responsibility 
One often-overlooked aspect of the WannaCry attack is that, even though more than 400,000 
computers in over 150 countries were hit, millions were not affected because they had 
updated their software. For this reason, WannaCry was defined as a “tribute to negligence”.3 
This is a common feature in modern cyberattacks: in most 
cases, basic computer hygiene such as keeping software 
updated, using strong passwords, encrypting sensitive data 
and keeping copies in the cloud are sufficient to protect 
computers from such incidents.4 As mentioned in the 2017 
High Level Group of Scientific Advisors on Cybersecurity to 
the European Commission,5 many Europeans still fail to 
take basic cybersecurity measures: many say they care a lot about their personal data, but 
then give them away for free on social networks. Data are striking: 90% of the data breaches 
reported by the 2017 Verizon Data Breach Investigation were the result of phishing. And for 
those who are successfully phished it is not over because they can expect it to happen again 
at least once during the same year. Even some professionals do not take security issues 
seriously: in 2016 the Ponemon Institute revealed that 50% of interviewed professionals said 
that they had no password, PIN or biometric security guarding their devices, and two-thirds 
said that they didn’t encrypt their data.6  
Cybersecurity should therefore become a collective 
responsibility and cyber awareness and computer hygiene 
should become an integral part of digital literacy programmes. 
Without awareness-raising campaigns and smart policies, 
cybersecurity will always be dogged by collective action 
                                                     
3
 James Luiss (2017), Darwin and Ransomware, CSIS. 
4
 See Roger A. Grimes (2018), “The two most imporatnt ways to defend aginst security threats”, CSO, 7 February. 
5
 European Commission (2017), “Cybersecurity in the European Digital Single Market”, March, p. 21. 
6
 J.R. Raphael (2017), “5 mobile security threats you should take seriously in 2018”, CSO, 13 December. 
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problems, which trigger insufficient investment due to the likelihood of free riding. Put 
differently, computer hygiene and basic cybersecurity arrangements should become part of 
the everyday skills of any internet user, and in the corporate environment cybersecurity 
should become an overall management challenge, requiring a holistic risk- management 
approach. These issues seem to be on the radar screen of the European Commission, but a 
greater effort is needed to promote awareness in member states.  
Smart policies for resilience 
The EU launched its first initiative on IT security in 2006, later replaced by a Cybersecurity 
Strategy in 2013, and most recently by a comprehensive cybersecurity package in September 
2017.7 The latter includes far-reaching measures such as strengthening the role of the 
European Union Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA); improving rapid 
emergency response to cyber-attacks; creating a Cybersecurity Emergency Respond Fund; 
building a cybersecurity competence network with a European Cybersecurity Research and 
Competence Centre; creating  an effective criminal law 
response and increasing cyber defence capabilities. All 
these measures represent an ambitious plan and a 
significant step forward. However, given the very 
fragmented nature of the cybersecurity landscape in 
Europe and the voluntary nature of cooperation and 
information-sharing among member states, the EU’s 
ability to operate through a single coordination point 
remains uncertain, at best. The need to build a European cyber shield might require a more 
federalist, not merely inter-governmental, solution, with one single EU body in charge of 
attributing responsibility to react and coordinate emergency responses to be implemented at 
the national level.8  
In this respect, trust and coordination are the two pillars of a future EU cybersecurity 
strategy. Trust is not only needed between public institutions, but also between public and 
private players. Take, for example, information-sharing practices on data breaches. The cost 
of disclosing a breach can be significant and private, while the benefits of improved disclosure 
are pervasive and public. The imbalance between costs (sustained by a firm) and benefits (for 
all) generates a market failure. It is thus clear that new conceptual approaches to 
cybersecurity are required to make the behaviour of all players in this market more incentive-
compatible.  
In this context, it would be helpful to discuss the use of legal liability and insurance to create 
better incentives for safer behaviour and to work towards convergence between security and 
safety, especially in light of the emergence of the Internet of Things, which will embed 
                                                     
7
 European Commission (2017), https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/better-regulation/initiatives/com-2017-477_en. 
8
 See on this also EPSC (2017), “Building an Effective European Cyber Shield”, Issue 24 May. 
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computer and communications everywhere.9 Software will be omnipresent, but software and 
software-based products have inherent vulnerabilities. It has been estimated that the average 
programme has at least 14 separate points of vulnerability.10 Each of these weaknesses could 
allow attackers to compromise the integrity of the product and potentially make an illicit 
entry. Software vulnerabilities therefore pose a serious concern for everyone and require the 
development of ad hoc policies to coordinate the disclosure of vulnerabilities and the 
implementations of the appropriate remedies coordinated vulnerability disclosure (CVD). At 
the moment, only few EU member states have these policies in place. Therefore, the role and 
the implementation of a CVD process across member states and precisely how and whether 
governments decide to release or retain a zero-day vulnerability for national security 
purposes (Vulnerability Equity Process, VEP) should be more broadly discussed to define a 
comprehensive framework to manage vulnerabilities. CEPS has promoted a Task Force on 
these issues and is working with the private sector, the EU institutions and civil society to 
suggest guidelines and recommendations for a CVD and VEP in Europe.11  
Investing in relationships for a safer and more stable cyberspace 
Trust-based relationships are essential to cybersecurity and resilience policy. A public-private, 
well-designed governance of emerging challenges such as massive, pervasive state-sponsored 
cyberattacks is becoming unavoidable. Yet global dialogue on these matters is not proceeding 
smoothly. Discussions about the introduction of global norms of responsible state behaviour, 
in particular the activity of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on 
Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of 
International Security (UN GGE), are stalled on key issues such as the right of self-defence and 
state responsibility for cyberspace.12 Likewise, only 56 countries have so far ratified the 
Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, 16 years after its official adoption.13 At this rate, it 
would take until 2040 to have the majority of the world’s nations sign it. Russia does not 
agree with Art. 32 of the Convention concerning trans-border access to stored computer data 
– and is proposing another treaty based on the Minsk Convention.14 China, India and Brazil 
refuse to sign it since they were not involved in the negotiation and see the Convention as a 
                                                     
9
 See Eireann Leverett, Richard Clayton and Ross Anderson (2017), “Standardization and Certification of the 
“Internet of Things”, mimeo. 
10
 “The myth of cyber-security”, The Economist, 8 April 2017, p. 9. 
11
 See https://www.ceps.eu/content/software-vulnerability-disclosure-europe. 
12
 Digital Watch Newsletter (2017), issue 22, 30 June (https://dig.watch/DWnewsletter22). 
13
Council of Europe (2018), https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/185/ 
signatures?p_auth=Iua5Qg9O. 
14
 See Wolfgang Kleinwachter (2018), “Internet Governance Outlook 2018: Preparing for Cyberwar or Promoting 
Cyber Detente?”, CircleID, 6 January. The Minsk Convention on Legal Assistance and Legal Relations in Civil, 
Family and Criminal Matters was signed in 1993 and is in force between the following states: Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russian Federation, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan. The 
Convention sets the rules for legal cooperation between member states’ courts in civil, family and criminal 
matters. See CIS arbitration Forum (http://www.cisarbitration.com/about-cis-arbitration-forum/) 
EU CYBERSECURITY AND THE PARADOX OF PROGRESS | 5 
 
“fait accompli being forced upon them”.15 And today, the process is further hampered by 
frictions in Trans-Atlantic relations, which seem to be exacerbated by the Trump presidency 
and the agreement on permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) among 25 EU member 
states, raising questions about the future prominence of NATO.16 
How are EU member states responding to these challenges? This situation has required them 
to use all the diplomatic and economic means at their disposal. First, the EU has developed a 
framework known as the Joint EU Diplomatic Response to Malicious Cyber Activities (the 
‘cyber diplomacy toolbox’) that sets out measures under the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy, including restrictive measures such as sanctions.17 Second, the new Cybersecurity Act 
proposed by the Commission aims to strengthen international cooperation on cybersecurity 
through the development of initiatives on external relations (bilateral, regional, multi 
stakeholder and multilateral engagements), the promotion of international cybersecurity 
capacity-building in third countries with a dedicated EU Cyber Capacity Building Network  and 
increasing EU-NATO cooperation on cybersecurity. These measures are important but not 
sufficient to allow the EU to play a greater role in the international cybersecurity policy arena, 
especially considering the current geopolitical landscape and the potential role that a ‘post- 
American Europe’ could play in it.18 Indeed, over the last decade, the US has reduced its 
diplomatic and political presence in Europe, creating an opportunity for Europe to take a 
greater responsibility in the international policy arena. Meanwhile, worried about the 
stalemate in international negotiations on confidence-building measures in cyberspace, the 
private sector has put forward specific proposals. Microsoft launched the idea of a Digital 
Geneva Convention, envisaging initiatives such as the no targeting of tech companies, the 
private sector or critical infrastructure and the creation of an independent organisation to 
investigate the attribution of nation state attacks to specific countries, like the role played by 
the Atomic Energy Agency. 
Multistakeholder organisations such as the Global Commission on Stability in Cyberspace 
(GCSC) recently launched a Call to protect the public core of the Internet,19 which is an appeal 
for a new set of rules for state and non-state actors mandating that they refrain from activity 
that “intentionally and substantially damages the general availability or integrity of the 
Internet itself”.20  
                                                     
15
 See Rich Baich (2017), “International Cybersecurity Strategy”, CSIS Report, p. 66. 
16
 See Matthew Karnitschnig (2018), “Transatlantic tensions spill into view at security gathering”, Politico, 16 
February (https://www.politico.eu/article/defense-europe-transatlantic-tensions-spill-into-view-at-security-
gathering/). 
17
 European Commission (2018), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/cyber-security. 
18
 Thomas Wright (2017), “A Post-American Europe and the Future of U.S. Strategy”, Brookings Institution, 
December. 
19
 GCSC (2017), https://cyberstability.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/call-to-protect-the-public-core-of-the-
internet.pdf.  
20
 Idem.  
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Against this background, the EU as ‘norm superpower’ 
should take the lead in this effort to define new norms to 
protect the civilian use of the internet and avoid its 
militarisation. Regarding cybercrime, the Budapest 
Convention is an important step, but it will only work if 
everyone adopts it. The current stalemate in the signature 
process of the Convention calls for new negotiating vehicles that would give to nations that 
do not agree with the text the opportunity to voice their concerns. Furthermore, the EU 
should increase bilateral activity and cooperation on cyber-security with ‘fence-sitter’ states 
such India and Brazil, still at the early stage of policy development, to move forward in the 
fight against cybercrime.21  
Conclusions 
Technological progress often comes with great opportunities, but equally important threats. 
The paradox of progress, already observed in medical research, has reached cyberspace. And 
if nothing is done to address it, it might critically undermine the very foundations of the open 
internet society. The EU’s current efforts to create resilience and enhance deterrence in 
cyberspace are steps in the right direction, but critical issues still need to be addressed. The 
new Cybersecurity Act could represent an important opportunity, if accompanied by 
additional measures to increase awareness, smarter policy and effective governance. Too 
many users and businesses still fail to take cybersecurity and computer hygiene seriously. 
Greater effort is required to strengthen the pan-European coordination of deterrence, 
detection, and defence. And the international debate should shift gear with a more proactive 
European role in the definitions of new norms to protect civilians online and in the promotion 
of new initiatives to speed up the ratification of the Budapest Convention. 
The diplomatic and political retrenchment of the USA from 
Europe and other parts of the world presents the post-
America Europe with an opportunity to play a new role in 
much-needed global cybersecurity policy. Enhanced 
cooperation on security and defence among member states 
could mark a new era in the Union’s involvement in global 
cyber-governance. Will EU leaders take up the challenge?  
                                                     
21
 See Rich Baich (2017) and Thomas Renard (2018), “EU Cyber partnerships: assessing the EU strategic 
partnerships with third countries in the cyber domain”, European Politics and Society, 29 January. 
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